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Why We Are All Jurisprudes (or, at 
Least, Should Be)
Michelle Madden Dempsey 
Introduction
What follows is a lightly revised speech I presented at a symposium on 
The Future of Legal Scholarship in April 2016 at Northeastern University School 
of Law. It presents a brief overview of the questions that have traditionally 
occupied the fi eld of jurisprudence, fl ags up a growing movement within the 
fi eld to eliminate these questions, and defends the view that getting the right 
answers to these questions remains an important project.1
We’ve gathered today to address the future of legal scholarship. Given the 
“new normal” in the legal academy, with restricted (or eliminated) resources 
dedicated to supporting scholarship, many areas of legal scholarship are 
under threat. The value of legal scholarship in general is being attacked both 
within and outside the academy, and perhaps no area of legal scholarship is 
more derided than jurisprudence. Most critics will agree that at least some kinds 
of legal scholarship may still be of value. Empirical legal scholarship, they 
may concede, can tell us something useful and true about the world in which 
we live, while doctrinal scholarship can potentially be of service to judges in 
interpreting and applying the law, to litigators in arguing what the law is or 
should be, and to legislators in creating new law, etc . But jurisprudence? In 
the “new normal” of the legal academy, jurisprudence is increasingly regarded 
as an indulgent waste of time.2
1. By way of clarifi cation, the term “jurisprudes” in my title is meant simply to refer to legal 
scholars who engage legal philosophy (jurisprudence).
2. See, e.g., Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts, Jr., Interview at Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Annual Conference, available at www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/
conversation-chief-justice-roberts at approx. 30:40 (June 25, 2011) (“Pick up a copy of 
any law review that you see and the fi rst article is likely to be, you know, the infl uence of 
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which 
I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the 
bar.”). Roberts’s comment was widely regarded as disdainful of legal scholarship such 
as jurisprudence. For an amusing response, see Orin Kerr, The Infl uence of Immanuel Kant on 
Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251, available at http://online.
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/kantbulgaria_kerr.pdf
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In this atmosphere, it is tempting to be pessimistic about the future of 
jurisprudence. Perhaps the skeptics are right and jurisprudence is a waste 
of time—time better spent focusing on empirical or doctrinal scholarship 
or, better yet, teaching our students to be “practice ready” at graduation. 3 
However, I think the skeptics are wrong—and the time is ripe to be optimistic 
about the future of jurisprudence. Indeed, I think the future of jurisprudence 
can and should be defended not only from nonjurisprude critics, but from the 
internal critique it faces from the relatively new “eliminativism” trend within 
jurisprudence.
Before I go any further, two points deserve attention. First, I should confess 
that I don’t consider jurisprudence to be my main focus of scholarship. While 
my doctoral studies and much of my scholarship is informed by analytic legal 
philosophical methods, most of my work tends to focus on the philosophy of 
criminal law.4 Second, as you might expect of an analytic legal philosopher, 
I think we should start by getting very clear about what, precisely, we mean by 
jurisprudence. Literally, jurisprudence means (from the Latin), “wisdom about 
the law”—but I take it that I’ve been asked to address the philosophical study 
of law. Understood as such, the topic of jurisprudence can be carved up in 
diff erent ways. One helpful way is to subdivide it into general and particular 
jurisprudence—with general jurisprudence referring to a topic that concerns 
philosophical puzzles presented by all legal systems (e.g., What counts as valid 
law? What is the normative force of valid law?), and particular jurisprudence 
referring to philosophical puzzles that pop up in a given jurisdiction (e.g., 
What state actions violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause? 
What is the nature of judicial interpretation in a common law jurisdiction?), or 
within particular doctrinal categories (e.g., Is tort concerned with civil wrongs 
or the allocation of risk? What is the diff erence between torts and crimes?). 
I take it that the topic I’ve been asked to address today concerns general 
jurisprudence. One way to think about the topic of general jurisprudence is 
to divide it up into diff erent camps—or, as Ronald Dworkin memorably put it, 
competing “doctrinal armies.”5 Each army comes with its historic commander—
3. By “doctrinal scholarship” I mean scholarship that seeks to answer relatively narrow 
questions regarding which legal rules apply in a particular area of law in one or more 
jurisdictions (e.g., “Is necessity a defense to homicide in English law?” “Is sex without 
consent suffi  cient to establish the actus reus of rape in most U.S. states?”)—as distinct from 
jurisprudence which (as discussed below) tends to focus on more general questions (“What 
is law?” “What is the normative force of law?” “How does precedent constrain judicial 
decision-making?”). Of course, Ronald Dworkin’s infl uence in shaping questions of general 
jurisprudence has tended to blur the lines between doctrinal scholarship and jurisprudence. 
See, especially, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
4. All of this is simply to say that I don’t view myself as having any stake in ongoing debates 
in the fi eld of jurisprudence—although, as will become clear, I do have some philosophical 
commitments regarding jurisprudential issues that will inform my refl ections.
5. Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 37 (2004), urging “young scholars who have not yet joined a doctrinal army” to 
endorse his interpretivist methodological commitments. Note that Dworkin’s use of the 
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the intellectual leader of that jurisprudential army, who contributed most 
to framing the questions and providing answers that concern general 
jurisprudence. And so, on this view, we have H.L.A. Hart as the commander 
of the legal positivist army 6—with later variations of legal positivism giving 
rise to Joseph Raz’s exclusive legal positivist camp7—and Wil Waluchow, 
Jules Coleman and others in the inclusive legal positivist camp.8 On the 
other side we have Commander Ronald Dworkin and his forces in the anti-
positivist doctrinal army.9 And somewhere closer to legal positivism, albeit 
uncomfortably so, we have Commander John Finnis and the New Natural 
Law general jurisprudential forces. 10
Primarily, general jurisprudence has been concerned with getting clear 
(perhaps obsessively so) about what it means to characterize something as legal 
and explaining what legal validity entails in terms of its normative force. Yet, in 
one of the more intriguing recent contributions to general jurisprudence, Scott 
Hershovitz urges us to embrace what he calls “The End of Jurisprudence”—by 
which he means both that we should put an end to this obsessive concern with 
clarity regarding what is legal and what is not, and that we should adopt a new 
“end” (goal) for jurisprudence—one that focuses more explicitly on “the moral 
consequences of our legal practices.” 11 Later, I’ll push back on Hershovitz 
and explain why I think the future of jurisprudence should continue to be 
concerned with getting clear about what is legal, precisely because of the moral 
consequences of our legal practices. First, however, I want to explain the sense 
in which we (meaning, we legal academics) are all jurisprudes (or, at least, why 
we should be)—and why we shouldn’t be only jurisprudes.
We Are All Jurisprudes (or, at Least, We Should Be)
If the way I’ve set up the topic of jurisprudence is plausible, then, to some 
extent, at least, we are all jurisprudes. We might not be writing articles, chapters 
or books on  topics such as, “What is law?” “What is a legal system?” “What 
is legal reasoning?” “What is the normative force of law?” etc.—but certainly 
all law professors must have some background sense of what their answers to 
phrase “doctrinal army” here is more akin to what I would characterize as “jurisprudential 
army.” See supra note 3, observing that Dworkin’s scholarship tended to blur the lines 
between doctrine and jurisprudence.
6. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Leslie Green, ed., 3d ed. 2012).
7. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2009).
8. WIL WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994); Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive 
Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
9. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); DWORKIN, supra note 3.
10. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011). On Finnis’s discomfort 
regarding the similarities between his account of the nature of law and the legal positivist’s 
account, see Michelle Madden Dempsey, On Finnis’s Way In, 57 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2012); John 
Finnis, Response, 57 VILL. L. REV. 925 (2012).
11. Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L. J. 1160, 1204 (2015).
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these questions would be. This background sense then informs our teaching 
and scholarship. To the extent that we can be self-aware of our answers to 
these questions, and consistent in our philosophical commitments as we teach 
any particular area of law, all the better. We don’t need to jump into the deep 
end of the Hart-Dworkin debates to get our 1L torts class through the basics 
of Palsgraf, or contemplate whether Finnis’s account of basic human goods 
is adequate in order to teach the diff erence between duress and necessity in 
criminal law. Of course, we might choose do that in our teaching (at our 
own risk of negative student evaluations), but we don’t have to engage these 
jurisprudential questions explicitly. What we do need, however—and what I 
imagine all of us have—is some more or less worked-out understanding of what 
we think we’re teaching when we teach law. And if something is a law, then 
we have some underlying explanation regarding whether we think that fact 
should mean anything for the people to whom it is addressed (e.g., Should 
people obey that thing that is a law?). So, in that sense, we’re all jurisprudes—
or, at least, we should be.
But even more important, we shouldn’t just be jurisprudes—at least not in 
the sense of being exclusively focused on the questions that have traditionally 
concerned general jurisprudence. Rather, as Robin West has compellingly 
argued, we (the legal academy) should take up a new kind of jurisprudence—
one that has been missing from the American scholarly landscape. 12 This 
“progressive natural law jurisprudence,” as she calls it, would focus on areas 
that have been neglected in the traditional general jurisprudence literature: 
“What does it mean for human beings to fl ourish, and how can law and 
legalism contribute? . . . When and where is law needed? What makes a good 
law good . . . and what makes it ineffi  cacious or worse?”13
In substance, I agree with West that we should focus far more than we do on 
questions regarding what makes for good (or bad) laws, and that our answers 
to those questions should be informed by a robust, progressive account of 
basic human goods. My only quibble is whether we should label this project 
under the heading of “jurisprudence” (as she does), or whether the project 
is better understood simply as a matter of “law reform.” If we stick with my 
limited account of general jurisprudence as a branch of philosophy that is 
concerned with questions such as “What is law?” “What is the normative force 
of law?” etc., then I would think that West’s project falls outside the ambit of 
jurisprudence. So while I endorse the project in substance, I prefer to think of 
it as an advisable add-on to jurisprudence, not an alternative or replacement. 
Perhaps it doesn’t matter whether we call it “jurisprudence” or “law 
reform.” Indeed, perhaps my desire for a tidy demarcation between the two 
is symptomatic of the arguably obsessive search for clarity that can make 
jurisprudes so annoying. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, 
12. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2011).
13. Id. at 11.
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[Jurisprudes] often comport themselves like the inhabitants of a small Pacifi c 
island . . . threatened by something like global warming: the waters of sloppy 
thinking are rising all around them and they must huddle closer and closer 
together on the vanishingly small piece of high ground that they currently 
occupy.14
While I take Waldron’s point, I do still think it’s important to distinguish 
jurisprudence from law reform, if only because the projects undertaken by the 
jurisprude are essential to the work of the law reformer. Jurisprudence (most 
importantly) provides an account of what law is. Without some understanding 
of what law is, how can the law reformer undertake to reform it? The law 
reformer with a confused understanding of law—one that sloppily confl ates 
legal norms with nonlegal social or political norms—would be an ineff ective 
law reformer, indeed. Simply put, what counts as law matters—especially if 
you’re trying to reform it.
The End of Jurisprudence?
Of course, not everyone agrees that what counts as law matters all that much. 
As I noted earlier, Hershovitz has recently urged jurisprudes to embrace “the 
end of jurisprudence,” and thus put aside our traditional concern with getting 
clear about how we characterize what is legal and what is not.15 On Hershovitz’s 
eliminativist account, he doesn’t “see why we should feel pressure” to get very 
clear about how we “characterize the legal domain.”16 Indeed, he thinks it’s 
a mistake to think of legal normativity as distinct from moral normativity—
and he holds this view even in the face of morally bad laws.17 Tracking closely 
onto Mark Greenberg’s view, neither Hershovitz nor Greenberg is terribly 
concerned to distinguish the legal from the nonlegal, because, they suppose, 
14. Jeremy Waldron, Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
375 (Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds. 2004).
15. Hershovitz, supra note 11.
16. Id. at 1202. Hershovitz characterizes his view as an “eliminativist” approach to jurisprudence 
because it eliminates the need to answer the central questions that frame the Hart-Dworkin 
debate—namely, what is law and what, if any, normative force does law have—by denying the 
existence of “a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity—that more 
traditional pictures presuppose.” Id. at 1193.
17. Id. at 1193. Hershovitz puts the point in terms of positing a distinctively legal domain (“[I]t 
seemed that we had to posit a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, 
to make sense of the way that we talk about law. But that’s a mistake.”). I reformulated 
the point in my recounting of Hershovitz’s because I take him to mean something like, 
“[I]t seemed that we had to [(think in terms of) or (assume the existence of)] a distinctively 
legal domain of normativity.” I don’t take him to be making any claims regarding whether 
it seemed that we had to “posit” such a domain—since that claim would raise a quite distinct 
question of whether it seemed we should have a distinctively legal domain, not whether we 
should think in terms of or assume the existence of such a domain.
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“the question of what obligations we classify as legal has no bearing ‘on what 
we take our genuine obligations to be.’”18
Like many other jurisprudes, I agree that the question of what obligations we 
classify as legal should have no bearing on what we take our genuine obligations 
to be. Which is to say, I agree that the law is “normatively inert”—the fact 
that some directive is a legal directive doesn’t mean that we should obey it.19 
Indeed, it could just as easily mean that we should criticize it and reform it. 
The fact that something counts as law doesn’t tell us anything about what 
sort of practical attitude to adopt toward it in terms of obedience, critique, or 
reform.
I’m less inclined than Hershovitz to want to eliminate questions of what 
counts as legal and what does not, and the related question of which laws 
(if any) bear normative force—since, in practice, the distinction between what 
is legal and what is not legal does have great bearing on the perceptions and 
actions of many people who take themselves to be bound by the law. The 
real world is not fi lled with jurisprudes who recognize that the law has no 
genuinely moral normative force. Rather, it’s fi lled with people who very often 
perceive themselves to have a general moral obligation to obey the law. For 
them, the question of what obligations count as legal obligations has tremendous 
bearing on what they take their genuine moral obligations to be.
For this reason, if none other, we should continue the project of general 
jurisprudence—and defend it from its critics, both external and internal. We 
should still be concerned with getting very clear about what is legal and what 
is not—and not kid ourselves into thinking that the distinction doesn’t matter. 
It matters not because there is any genuinely moral normative force to law; 
it matters because folks out there often mistakenly think there is such moral 
normative force. 
The Importance of Jurisprudence in the Age of Trump
The importance of what counts as law was driven home to me recently 
listening to John Hockenberry’s National Public Radio broadcast The 
Takeaway.20 Mike Breen, CEO of Truman National Security Project and a 
former Army offi  cer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, off ered the following 
observations regarding Donald Trump’s potential presidency: “If you take the 
man at his word and you listen to his statements on the [campaign] trail, he 
set himself up, if he’s elected, to trigger the largest civil military crisis probably 
since the American Civil War.”21
18. Id. at 1201, citing Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1323-24 n.73 
(2014). 
19. John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 202-04, 210, 213 (2001).
20. Veteran: Trump Will Throw the Military into ‘Crisis,’ THE TAKEAWAY (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 28, 
2016).
21. Id.
35
The discussion recounted orders that Trump has suggested he would direct 
U.S. soldiers to carry out, which Breen characterized as “illegal orders”—
for example, targeting the children and families of suspected terrorists, 
intentionally murdering civilians, and torturing just for the sake of torturing. 
(“[Trump] says even if [torture] doesn’t work, let’s do it anyway.”22)  Moreover, 
as Breen recounts, Trump has said “the Geneva Convention makes American 
soldiers afraid to fi ght”23: “He’s talking about, as a presidential candidate, 
issuing clearly illegal orders that I think our senior military leaders would be 
very unlikely to follow.”24
Note the phrasing—“clearly illegal orders that I think our senior military 
leaders would be very unlikely to follow.” Hockenberry pushed back—pointing 
out the obvious fact that a morally evil legal order is, nonetheless, a legal order. 
Now, if Breen had been an exclusive legal positivist (as is my predilection), 
he could have taken Hockenberry’s point on board and simply replied 
(hypothetically) as follows:
Sure, a Commander in Chief’s order is a legal order—but even so, that doesn’t 
mean soldiers should kill innocent civilians! John, John, John . . . silly 
John. . . . Legal obligation is not a species of moral obligation. Rather, legal 
obligation is a distinct normative domain. Perhaps you’ve been reading too 
much Hershovitz?
Now, perhaps role morality gives members of the military good reasons to be 
cautious about rejecting the idea that legal obligation is a species of moral 
obligation. Perhaps some roles in society enjoin people to be inclined to treat 
law as if it bears genuine moral normativity. Perhaps. But then, that all depends 
on whether we can reasonably assume that the law is going to be good—or at 
least neutral—or, at the very least, only a little evil. If the law is really, deeply, 
horrifi cally evil, then we might just want everyone to recognize the truth that 
legal obligation is a distinct domain from moral obligation.
In any event, that is the kind of discussion Breen and Hockenberry might 
have had—but, instead, the conversation quickly devolved and they started 
talking past one another. Breen began using a concept of law that implicitly 
included moral criteria as a condition of legal validity, and Hockenberry 
doubled down on a concept of law that oddly combined both legal positivism 
and the assumption that valid laws ought to be obeyed. 25
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. I’m oversimplifying somewhat. Breen did refer to legal doctrine that might ground 
arguments against the legality of Trump’s potential orders. That said, each consideration 
Breen raised is itself subject to the Rule of Change. HART, supra note 6, 76-77. As such, there 
is nothing to prevent Trump’s orders from being recognized as valid legal orders.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, we are all and should be jurisprudes—perhaps not explicitly 
so in our scholarship—but certainly implicitly so, in both our teaching and 
our citizenship. Moreover, at least some of us should be law reformers. 
And, crucially, none of us should seek to eliminate the questions that make 
jurisprudence and law reform intelligible. 
The future of jurisprudence should continue both to clarify the conceptual 
criteria of what counts as law and to emphasize that legal obligations are not 
a species of moral obligation. For, if we do face an evil legal system that posits 
evil laws and evil legal orders, we should be steadfast in recognizing that legal 
validity does not entail the moral obligation to obey—and we should remain 
clear-eyed in identifying which laws need reform in order to eliminate the evil.
I will end with a quote from H.L.A. Hart—fi rst published in the aftermath 
of a horrifi cally evil, yet tragically legal, atrocity:
What surely is most needed in order to make [people] clear-sighted in 
confronting the offi  cial abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense 
that the certifi cation of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the 
question of obedience. . . . A concept of law which allows the invalidity of law 
to be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity and 
variety of these [two] separate issues. . . . So long as human beings can gain 
suffi  cient cooperation from some to enable them to dominate others, they will 
use the forms of law as one of their instruments.26
And so, let us all be, and remain, jurisprudes—and never forget that what the 
law demands we do, morality may demand we resist.
26. Hart, supra note 6, 210-211.
